The claim in this appeal arises from the brain injury suffered by C around the time of her delivery on 4 June 2018 … Ct, a severely brain-damaged child… was born by caesarean section having suffered acute profound hypoxic ischemia (“PHI”) before, during and following her birth. She suffers from quadriplegic cerebral palsy with severe global developmental delay. [1]
C’s case that following M’s admission at 36 weeks and 1 day gestation, as a result of negligent care provided to her, the C’s delivery was not competently managed. It is agreed that the injury resulted from a short period of near total hypoxic ischaemic injury. C contends that the delay in delivery, which resulted from a delay in transfer of M to the labour ward and thereafter a delay in commencing the monitoring of her heart rate during delivery, caused or materially contributed to her injury. [2]
C seeks to overturn a finding of fact made by J as to the time at which D consultant obstetrician on duty, would have entered M’s room in the labour ward having heard sounds representing bradycardia emanating from the transducer linked to the CTG which was set up to monitor FHR had the CTG been set up earlier and had the sounds representing bradycardia been heard by D when she was first outside M’s room. [3]
J made findings of fact in the liability-only trial [4]
the finding of fact that D would have entered M’s room at 17:52 and at the same time as in fact she did ([297]) must be quashed and the appeal allowed upon the basis that D would have entered the room at 17:51. The issue which now falls to be considered is what, if any difference, one minute would have made to the issue of medical causation. At trial this case did not proceed on the basis of a lost minute. [53]
we could not possibly depart from a finding of fact that was open to him on the evidence. However, the single error here was not one of fact-finding but of legal logic: on J’s own findings C would have been born a minute earlier. [57]
Now that the delay is measured at a minute, it will be a matter for J, having heard further expert evidence, to determine whether that period would as a matter of probability have spared C any material part of her injury. [58]
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